

Message Text

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PAGE 01 GENEVA 08375 01 OF 03 031043Z

ACTION ACDA-10

INFO OCT-01 EUR-12 IO-13 ISO-00 CIAE-00 H-01 INR-07

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FM USMISSION GENEVA

TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 1556

INFO USMISSION NATO

AMEMBASSY MOSCOW

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 1 OF 3 GENEVA 8375

NATO FOR FLOWERREE (NATO MEETING OF DISARMAMENT EXPERTS)

EO 11652: GDS

TAGS: PARM, CCD, US, UR

SUBJ: US-USSR CHEMICAL WEAPONS NEGOTIATIONS: ROUND

SIX, SECOND MEETING, SEPTEMBER 28, 1977

1. SUMMARY: AT SECOND MEETING OF PRESENT ROUND OF US-USSR ARMS CONTROL WORKING GROUP ON CHEMICAL WEAPONS (CW) ON SEPTEMBER 28, AMBASSADOR LIKHACHEV (HEAD OF SOVIET DEL) NOTED THAT PROHIBITION OF CW, AND PROHIBITION OF NEW MASS DESTRUCTION WEAPONS AND RADIOLOGICAL WEAPONS HAD BEEN DISCUSSED DURING RECENT VISIT OF FOREIGN MINISTER GROMYKO TO WASHINGTON. WITH RESPECT TO CW NEGOTIATIONS LIKHACHEV OUTLINED SOVIET VIEWS ON SCOPE AND VERIFICATION, INCLUDING PROVISIONS FOR INVITATIONAL ON-SITE INSPECTION. AMBASSADOR FISHER (HEAD OF US DEL) PRESENTED A DETAILED ANALYSIS OF THE VIEWS OF BOTH SIDES ON SCOPE AND PROPOSED THAT THE FORMULATION OF COMMON LANGUAGE, STARTING WITH SCOPE, BEGIN IN A DRAFTING GROUP. WHILE ACCEPTING IN PRINCIPLE THE CONCEPT OF A DRAFTING GROUP, LIKHACHEV SAID THAT THE SOVIET SIDE WOULD PREFER TO HAVE FULL US REACTION TO
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PAGE 02 GENEVA 08375 01 OF 03 031043Z

SOVIET BASIC PROVISIONS BEFORE STARTING DRAFTING GROUP.

NEXT MEETING SCHEDULED FOR 3:30 PM ON SEPTEMBER 30.

END SUMMARY.

2. US-USSR ARMS CONTROL WORKING GROUP ON CHEMICAL WEAPONS (CW) HELD MSECOND MEETING OF PRESENT ROUND ON AFTERNOON OF SEPTEMBER 28 IN US MISSION. AMBASSADOR LIKHACHEV

NOTED THAT AMONG SUBJECTS DISCUSSED DURING RECENT GROMYKO VISIT TO WASHINGTON WERE SALT, COMPREHENSIVE NUCLEAR TEXT BAN, NON-PROLIFERATION, PROHIBITION OF CW, AND PROHIBITION OF NEW MASS DESTRUCTION WEAPONS (MDW) AND RADIOLOGICAL WEAPONS (RW). NOTING THAT THE US AND SOVIET SIDES HAD STATED THEIR INTENTION DURING GROMYKO VISIT TO CONTINUE ACTIVE WORK TOWARD RESULTS IN THESE AREAS, LIKHATCHEV SAID THAT US-USSR WORKING GROUPS ON CW AND RW/NEW MDW WERE ACTIVELY CARRYING OUT THIS MADATE. COMMENT: US DEL WAS UNAWARE THAT CW OR RW/NEW MDW ISSUES WERE DISCUSSED DURING GROMYKO VISIT. IF WE SHOULD TAKE ANY OF THE VIEWS EXPRESSED ON THESE ISSUES INTO ACCOUNT DURING PRESENT NEGOTIATIONS, WE WOULD APPRECIATE BEING INFORMED END COMMENT.

3. REFERRING TO "CONSTRUCTIVE" PROPOSALS MADE BY USSR, IN THE FORM OF DRAFT CW BASIC PROVISIONS, DRAFT CONVENTION PROHIBITING NEW MDW, AND DRAFT AGREEMENT PROHIBITING RW, LIKHATCHEV SAID SOVIET SIDE HAD TAKEN STEPS TOWARD POSITIVE RESULTS AND INTENDED TO CONTINUE IN THIS SPIRIT. HE STRESSED THAT SOVIET SIDE EXPECTS RECIPROCITY WITHOUT WHICH RESULTS CANNOT BE ACHIEVED.

4. TURNING TO SCOPE OF CW PROHIBITION, LIKHATCHEV STATED THAT SOVIET SIDE HAD ALWAYS DESIRED WIDEST POSSIBLE PROHIBITION, BUT THAT SCOPE SHOULD BE "DOVETAILED WITH POSSIBILITIES OF VERIFICATION". IN SOVIET VIEW VERIFICATION
CONFIDENTIAL

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PAGE 03 GENEVA 08375 01 OF 03 031043Z

SHOULD BE WITHOUT PREJUDICE TO THE SOVEREIGNTY OF STATES PARTIES AND SHOULD NOT INTEFER WITH PEACEFUL ECONOMIC ACTIVITIES. HE STATED THAT THE CONVENTION SHOULD NOT EFFECT DUAL PURPOSE PRECURSORS AND ASKED IF THE US KNEW HOW TO IMPLEMENT VERIFICATION IN THIS AREA WITHOUT PREJUDICE TO PEACEFUL INDUSTRY. FROM SOVIET VIEWPOINT, HE SAID, THIS TASK SEEMS ALMOST IMPOSSIBLE TO ACHIEVE. LIKHATCHEV INDICATED THAT THE VEST WAY TO DEAL WITH THE PROBLEM WAS FOR STATES TO TAKE POLITICAL DECISION TO RENOUNCE DUAL PURPOSE PRECURSORS FOR MILITARY PURPOSES. IN THE VIEW OF SOVIET SIDE, A STATE THAT VIOLATED SUCH OBLIGATIONS WOULD FACE VERY SERIOUS POLITICAL CONSEQUENCES, AND ITS OTHER INTERNATIONAL OBLIGATIONS WOULD BE CALLED INTO QUESTION AS WELL.

5. LIKHATCHEV REITERRATED SOVIET VIEW ON SINGLE PURPOSE PRECURSORS AND SAID THAT "NEEDLESS TO SAY SOVIET SIDE WOULD PROHIBIT BINARY AND MULTICOMPONENT MUNITIONS." HE NOTED THAT SOVIET SIDE HAD ACCEPTED US PROPOSAL FOR DESTRUCTION IN EIGHT YEAR PERIOD. DESCRIBING IT AS FIMLY HELD VIEW, HE REITERATED PREVIOUS SOVIET POSITION THAT DECLARATION OF STOCKS SHOULD BE MADE ONLY AFTER

CONVENTION ENTERS INTO FORCE. LIKHATCHEV SUGGESTED THAT
DECLARATION TAKE PLACE SIX MONTHS AFTER CONVENTION ENTERS
INTO FORCE, CLAIMING THAT THIS TIME WOULD BE REQUIRED FOR
STATES TO PREPARE DECLARATION AND PLANS FOR DESTRUCTION.
FOLLOWING DECLARATION, HE SAID, A PARTY COULD PROCEED WITH
DESTRUCTION OF STOCKS. HE THOUGHT US SIDE COULD AGREE
THAT ARRANGEMENTS PROPOSED BY SOVIET SIDE WOULD BE BEST
WAY TO STRENGTHEN CONFIDENCE AMONG STATES PARTIES. SOVIET
SIDE PROPOSED THAT PLANS FOR DISMANTLING OR CONVERSION
TO PEACEFUL PURPOSES OF INDUSTRIAL FACILITIES WHICH PRODUCE
SINGLE PURPOSE AGENTS OR SINGLE PURPOSE PRECURSORS COULD
START BEFORE TREATY ENTERS INTO FORCE BUT SHOULD BE
DECLARED NOT LATER THAN ONE YEAR BEFORE DESTRUCTION OF
DECLARED STOCKS COMPLETED. SOVIETS WOULD BE READY TO
CONFIDENTIAL

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PAGE 04 GENEVA 08375 01 OF 03 031043Z

CONSIDER ANY OTHER TIMING ARRANGEMENTS PROPOSED BY US.

7. NOTING THAT THE US HAD ASKED FOR SOVIET VIEWS ON A
CONSULTATIVE COMMITTEE, LIKHATCHEV THOUGHT IT SHOULD "HAVE
RIGHTS AS A KIND OF SEMI-PERMANENT ORGAN," WITH A SMALL
TECHNICAL SECRETARIAT TO CARRY OUT THE WORK. THE
SECRETARIAT WOULD BE INVOLVED IN THE COLLECTION, ANALYSIS,

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PAGE 01 GENEVA 08375 02 OF 03 031107Z
ACTION ACDA-10

INFO OCT-01 EUR-12 IO-13 ISO-00 CIAE-00 H-01 INR-07
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TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 1557
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 2 OF 3 GENEVA 8375

NATO FOR FLOWERREE (NATO MEETING OF DISARMAMENT EXPERTS)

AND EXCHANGE OF CERTAIN INFORMATION, INCLUDING DECLARATIONS AND REPORTS OF COMPLIANCE FROM STATES AND INFORMATION FROM VARIOUS INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS. PLENARY MEETINGS OF THE CONSULTATIVE COMMITTEE COULD BE CALLED AS NEEDED AS WELL AS UPON THE REQUEST OF ANY STATE PARTY. LIKHATCHEV SAID FOREGOING PROPOSALS WERE AN ELABORATION OF BASIC PROVISIONS 17 AND 18. HE ENVISIONED A FLEXIBLE METHOD OF WORK FOR THE COMMITTEE AND SAID THAT IF THE TWO SIDES COULD COME TO AN UNDERSTANDING ALONG THE LINES HE HAD SUGGESTED THAT THERE WOULD NOT BE ANY OBJECTIONS LATER IN THE CCD. HE SAID PREPARATION FOR ESTABLISHMENT OF COMMITTED WOULD BEGIN IMMEDIATELY AFTER CONVENTION ENTERED INTO FORCE AND PROPOSED THAT CONSULTATIVE COMMITTEE BE ESTABLISHED THREE MONTHS AFTER THE CONVENTION ENTERS INTO FORCE. HE INDICATED SOVIETS WILLING TO CONSIDER OTHER TIMING ARRANGEMENTS.

8. LIKHATCHEV SAID THAT A STATE CALLING FOR (ON-SITE) VERIFICATION SHOULD GIVE CORRESPONDING ARGUMENTS TO SUBSTANTIATE NEED FOR SUCH VERIFICATION. IN ITS TURN, A CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 GENEVA 08375 02 OF 03 031107Z

STATE ABOUT WHICH DOUBT HAS BEEN EXPRESSED WITH REGARD TO COMPLIANCE MAY INVITE AN INSPECTION IF IT FINDS THAT THE REQUEST HAS MERIT, OR IT MAY TAKE ANOTHER DECISION. LIKHATCHEV SAID THAT SOVIET APPROACH TO INSPECTION ON A VOLUNTARY BASIS UNDER A CW CONVENTION DID NOT DIFFER FROM SOVIET POSITION ON THIS ISSUE WITH RESPECT TO A COMPREHENSIVE NUCLEAR WEAPONS TEST BAN. HE STATED THAT THE SOVIET SIDE IS FIRMLY CONVINCED THAT THIS KIND OF APPROACH COMBINES POSSIBILITY ON ENSURING CONFIDENCE OF COMPLIANCE WITH NON-INFRINGEMENT ON SOVEREIGN RIGHTS OF STATES PARTIES. HE SUGGESTED THAT THE STATE HARBORING DOUBTS MAKE A REQUEST FOR AN ON-SITE VISIT DIRECTLY TO THE STATE UNDER SUSPICION (RATHER THAN GOING THROUGH CONSULTATIVE COMMITTEE). SHOULD A STATE REJECT A REQUEST FOR AN ON-SITE INSPECTION, SUCH A REJECTION WOULD NOT INFLUENCE THE EFFECTIVENESS OF THE CONVENTION IF REQUEST DEMONSTRATED TO BE UNFOUNDED. WHEN THERE ARE DOUBTS BECAUSE A STATE REJECTS A REQUEST, CONSULTATIONS COULD TAKE PLACE IN THE CONSULTATIVE COMMITTEE. IN PRACTICAL TERMS, HE SAID, A STATE WHICH WAS CONFRONTED WITH INFORMATION AND ACCUSED OF A VIOLATION WOULD HAVE TO PRESENT CONVINCING TESTIMONY THAT WOULD REBUT THE ACCUSATION OR FACE A VERY DIFFICULT POLITICAL SITUATION.

9. LIKHATCHEV ENDED HIS PREPARED STATEMENT BY SAYING THAT THE SOVIET SIDE HAD ANSWERED MOST OF THE QUESTIONS RAISED

BY THE US SIDE AND WAS PREPARED TO CONTINUE TO WORK ON PREPARATION OF THE DRAFT JOINT INITIATIVE. HE SAID "NOW THE BALL IS IN THE US COURT." HE SAID THAT THE QUESTIONS OF HOW TO ORGANIZE WORK ON JOINT INITIATIVE AND WHERE TO START COULD BE DISCUSSED AT A SUBSEQUENT MEETING.

10. AMBASSADOR FISHER (HEAD OF US DEL) RECALLED HIS
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PAGE 03 GENEVA 08375 02 OF 03 031107Z

SUGGESTION AT PREVIOUS MEETING THIS ROUND THAT THE TWO SIDES BEGIN WORK ON COMMON LANGUAGE WHERE VIEWS COINCIDE OR ARE SIMILAR, AND THAT SOVIET SIDE HAD ACCEPTED THIS SUGGESTION. HE THOUGHT IT WOULD BE USEFUL AND LOGICAL TO LOOK FIRST AT ISSUE OF SCOPE OF PROHIBITION WHERE THE VIEWS OF THE TWO SIDES SEEM CLOSEST. FISHER PROCEEDED TO ANALYZE THE POSITIONS OF THE TWO SIDES ON SCOPE OBSERVING THAT BOTH SIDES PROPOSE THAT ELIMINATION OF CW BE ACHIEVED IN A SINGLE MEASURE. NOTING THAT SOVIET BASIC PROVISION NUMBER 1 LINKS SCOPE WITH POSSIBILITIES FOR CARRYING OUT VERIFICATION WITHOUT PREJUDICE TO SOVEREIGNTY, FISHER SAID QUOTE THE U.S. DOES NOT DISAGREE THAT A RELATIONSHIP MUST EXIST BETWEEN THE SCOPE OF THE PROHIBITION IN ANY TREATY AND THE PROCEDURES FOR VERIFICATION THAT ARE AGREED TO IN THAT TREATY. THIS RELATIONSHIP SHOULD BE SUCH THAT, TAKING INTO ACCOUNT THE TREATY AS A WHOLE, THE GAINS TO THE SECURITY OF THE PARTIES RESULTING FROM THE INHIBITIONS IMPOSED BY THE TREATY OUTWEIGH THE DANGERS RESULTING FROM ANY RISK THAT THE AGREED PROCEDURE FOR VERIFICATION MAY NOT DISCLOSE VIOLATIONS IN A TIMELY MANNER. THIS RELATIONSHIP MUST BE SUCH THAT THE NET EFFECT OF THE TREATY IS TO INCREASE, RATHER THAN TO DIMINISH, THE SECURITY OF ALL THE PARTIES TO THE TREATY. END QUOTE.

11. FISHER SAID THAT THERE SEEMS TO BE AGREEMENT THAT THE PRINCIPAL CRITERION FOR DETERMINING WHAT IS ALLOWED AND WHAT IS NOT SHOULD BE THE GENERAL PURPOSE CRITERION. THE US SIDE SEES THIS AS MEANING THAT ACTIVITIES WHICH ARE NOT JUSTIFIED FOR PROTECTIVE OR OTHER PEACEFUL PURPOSES, OR FOR MILITARY ACTIVITIES NOT RELATED TO CHEMICAL WARFARE, WOULD BE PROHIBITED.

12. FISHER NOTED THAT THERE IS NOT FULL AGREEMENT ON HOW TO DEAL WITH PRECURSORS. HOWEVER, THE POSITIONS SEEM TO COINCIDE ON LETHAL TOXICITY CRITERIA, AND THE SOVIET CONCEPT OF "HARMFUL" APPEARS SIMILAR TO US CONCEPT OF
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PAGE 04 GENEVA 08375 02 OF 03 031107Z

"OTHER HIGHLY TOXIC CHEMICALS". IN US VIEW, CARCINOGENS AND TERATOGENS (CHEMICALS WHICH CAUSE CANCER OR BIRTH DEFECTS AND WHICH SOVIETS REFER TO IN THEIR BASIC PROVISION NUMBER 7) DO NOT APPEAR TO BE IMPORTANT POTENTIAL CHEMICAL AGENTS. HE SAID THAT THE US SIDE DOES NOT BELIEVE IT DESIRABLE TO SINGLE OUT SPECIFIC CATEGORIES OF CHEMICALS OR TO INCLUDE SUBSTANCES, SUCH AS RIOT CONTROL AGENTS, WHICH ARE RELATIVELY SAFE, BUT WISHES TO RELY ON THE

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PAGE 01 GENEVA 08375 03 OF 03 031126Z

ACTION ACDA-10

INFO OCT-01 EUR-12 IO-13 ISO-00 CIAE-00 H-01 INR-07

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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 3 OF 3 GENEVA 8375

NATO FOR FLOWEREE (NATO MEETING OF DISARMAMENT EXPERTS)

GENERAL PURPOSE CRITERION IN ORDER TO ENSURE THAT ALL POTENTIAL AGENTS ARE COVERED. HE SAID THAT THE PURPOSE CRITERION WOULD HAVE THE EFFECT OF PROHIBITING THE USE OF CARCINOGENS AND TERATOGENS FOR CHEMICAL WARFARE PURPOSES. FISHER NOTED THAT BOTH SIDES HAVE TAKEN THE POSITION THAT DEVELOPMENT OF PROTECTIVE EQUIPMENT SHOULD BE PERMITTED AND HAVE ACKNOWLEDGED THAT USE OF CHEMICAL AGENTS FOR SUCH PURPOSES SHOULD BE ALLOWED UNDER AGREED CONTROLS. ADDITIONALLY, PRODUCTION AND USE OF SMALL QUANTITIES OF SINGLE-PURPOSE CHEMICALS SHOULD BE ALLOWED TO THE EXTENT JUSTIFIED BY THE NEEDS OF MEDICAL AND SCIENTIFIC WORK FOR PEACEFUL PURPOSES.

13. FISHER NOTED THAT THE SOVIET SIDE HAS PROPOSED TO ALLOW THE USE OF CHEMICAL AGENTS IN FIELD EXERCISES WITH THE PARTICIPATION OF TROOPS AND ASKED FOR MORE PRECISE INFORMA-

TION ON SIVET VIEWS, ESPECIALLY HOW ONE WOULD ENSURE THAT OFFENSIVELY-ORIENTED EXERCISES WERE NOT CARRIED OUT.

14. FISHER PROPOSED THAT FORMULATION OF COMMON LANGUAGE
CONFIDENTIAL

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PAGE 02 GENEVA 08375 03 OF 03 031126Z

BEGIN NEXT DAY IN A DRAFTING GROUP, STARTING WITH SCOPE. HE ALSO NOTED THAT SOVIET SIDE HAD NOT YET RESPONDED TO QUESTION REQUESTING CLARIFICATION OF THEIR POSITION ON ENTRY INTO FORCE PROVISIONS.

15. LIKHATCHEC SAID THAT SOVIET SIDE WOULD STUDY US STATEMENT ON SCOPE AND ASKED US SIDE TO LOOK AT WHAT HE HAD SAID ON SCOPE. HE ALSO INDICATED THAT SOVIET SIDE WAS "EAGERLY AWAITING US RESPONSE" ON ISSUE OF VERIFICATION, WHICH SOVIET SAID WOULD LIKE TO HAVE BEFORE WORKING OUT ELABORATION OF COMMON LANGUAGE. HE SAID THAT WHILE THE SOVIET SIDE ACCEPTED IN PRINCIPLE THE US PROPOSAL DEALING WITH A DRAFTING GROUP, IT WOULD LIKE TIME TO STUDY THE PROPOSAL AND OBTAIN A FULL UNDERSTANDING OF US POSITION BEFORE STARTING WORK OF DRAFTING GROUP.

16. FISHER SAID THAT US WOULD MOST LIKELY ADDRESS DECLARATION AND DESTRUCTION OF STOCKS RATHER THAN VERIFICATION AT NEXT MEETING. HE EXPRESSED VIEW THAT SUFFICIENT AGREEMENT ALREADY EXISTS ON SCOPE FOR DRAFTING GROUP TO START ITS WORK.

17. NEXT MEETING SCHEDULED FOR AFTERNOON SEPTEMBER 30.
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